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Previous deception research on repeated interviews found that liars are not less
consistent than truth tellers, presumably because liars use a “repeat strategy” to be
consistent across interviews. The goal of this study was to design an interview procedure
to overcome this strategy. Innocent participants (truth tellers) and guilty participants
(liars) had to convince an interviewer that they had performed several innocent activities
rather than committing a mock crime. The interview focused on the innocent activities
(alibi), contained specific central and peripheral questions, and was repeated after
1 week without forewarning. Cognitive load was increased by asking participants to
reply quickly. The liars’ answers in replying to both central and peripheral questions
were significantly less accurate, less consistent, and more evasive than the truth
tellers’ answers. Logistic regression analyses yielded classification rates ranging from
around 70% (with consistency as the predictor variable), 85% (with evasive answers
as the predictor variable), to over 90% (with an improved measure of consistency
that incorporated evasive answers as the predictor variable, as well as with response
accuracy as the predictor variable). These classification rates were higher than the
interviewers’ accuracy rate (54%).
Keywords: deception detection, lie detection, inconsistency, strategic interviewing, cognitive load, alibi,
deception cues
INTRODUCTION
In 2000, Jonathan Kaled, Matthew Daniels, and Frank Kuecken, teenagers from New Baltimore,
Michigan, were arrested and charged with the murder of Justin Mello during the robbery of
the pizza place where Mello worked. Kaled and Kuecken confessed to the crime, but they later
recanted, arguing that they had been coerced into confessing by the police. However, “[i]n light
of the confessions, claims of individuals that the three men had all been present at the same party
miles away from New Baltimore at the time of the murder were not taken seriously” (Drizin and
Leo, 2004, p. 978). Charges against Daniels were later dropped, but Kaled and Kuecken spent over
6 months in prison before being released after the real perpetrator confessed (Drizin and Leo, 2004).
In this paper, we present the first steps toward developing an interview procedure that could be
useful to assess the veracity of suspects in cases such as Kaled, Daniels, and Kuecken’s.
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The Challenge to Detect Deception in
Criminal Investigations: Inconsistencies
and Deception
There are contexts where detecting deception is crucial. For
instance, law enforcement officers need to be able to ascertain
whether suspects denying their criminal involvement are lying or
telling the truth. King and Dunn (2010) stated that:
[L]ying to the police and other law enforcement officials can have
profound judicial consequences. The detection of deception may
greatly concern those in law enforcement, including police officers
collecting evidence, customs officials attempting to prevent terrorists
from crossing a border, detectives interrogating a suspect, and
intelligence operatives pressing for information concerning potential
attacks. Deception in these settings may take a number of forms.
For example, a criminal may lie in order to avoid further scrutiny
or arrest. Witnesses may lie to either avoid providing pertinent
information or to fabricate information. Similarly, victims may
embellish their accounts or withhold crucial information. Any of
these deceptions may thwart a law enforcement investigation (p.
306).
However, detecting deception is extremely difficult. Meta-
analyses reveal that the humans’ ability to separate truths from
lies on the basis of the sender’s behavior hardly exceeds chance
probability (Aamodt and Custer, 2006; Bond and DePaulo,
2006), and that practitioners whose jobs require skill at detecting
deception are not more accurate than lay people (e.g., Aamodt
and Custer, 2006; Bond and DePaulo, 2006; Vrij, 2008). The
reason for this low performance is that behavioral differences
between truth tellers and liars are small and may change under
the influence of a number of moderator variables (DePaulo et al.,
2003; Sporer and Schwandt, 2006, 2007). In a series of meta-
analyses, Hartwig and Bond (2011) found that humans trying to
judge veracity pay attention to the right cues, but even those cues
are not very strongly associated with veracity (Hartwig and Bond,
2011). As a result, accuracy rates are low. The corollary is clear:
to improve observers’ detection accuracy, behavioral differences
between truth tellers and liars should be increased (Hartwig and
Bond, 2011).
Over the last decade, researchers have been working toward
this goal. A number of interviewing approaches have been
developed to increase behavioral differences between liars and
truth tellers (see reviews by Vrij et al., 2010a; Vrij and Granhag,
2012; Vrij, 2014). Some of these approaches attempt to elicit
inconsistencies in liars but not in truth tellers (see Vredeveldt
et al., 2014).
Different interviewing approaches can produce different
sorts of inconsistencies. It may be useful to differentiate
between statement-evidence, between-person, and within-person
inconsistencies. The Strategic Use of Evidence Technique (see,
e.g., Granhag et al., 2007; Hartwig et al., 2014) aims at
eliciting inconsistencies between the guilty suspects’ statements
and the evidence available to the police (Statement-evidence
inconsistencies). The unanticipated questions approach was
designed by Vrij et al. (2009) to detect inconsistencies between
pairs of liars interviewed separately and asked questions they
could hardly have anticipated—so they were not able to agree
on a common answer before the interview. These are between-
person inconsistencies. Finally, Leins et al. (2011, 2012) designed
a procedure to generate inconsistencies between the liars’ sketch
drawings of the layout of a restaurant (Leins et al., 2011) or a
room (Leins et al., 2012) and their own verbal description of
these places. These are within-person inconsistencies. Here we
describe the first steps toward creating a new interview approach
that attempts to generate another variant of within-person
inconsistencies: discrepancies between separate statements of the
same individual.
Previous research examining within-person inconsistencies
across repeated interviews revealed that liars were not less
consistent than truth tellers. Instead, liars were as or more
consistent than truth tellers (see Granhag and Strömwall, 2000,
2001, 2002; Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall and Granhag, 2005).
The authors explained this finding in terms of the repeat versus
reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag and Strömwall, 1999). Drawing
on the notion that liars might try to manipulate their behavior in
order to look honest (e.g., Buller and Burgoon, 1996; Zuckerman
et al., 1981), Granhag and Strömwall (1999) reasoned that liars
actively (and successfully) tried not to contradict themselves
across repeated interviews. Conversely, truth tellers simply tried
to recall the original experience in all interviews. However,
because human memory is reconstructive and error prone (e.g.,
Tulving, 2000; Loftus, 2003), the truth tellers’ recollections
showed some discrepancies (Granhag and Strömwall, 1999;
Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall and Granhag, 2005). As a result,
the net amount of inconsistencies was very similar regardless of
veracity.
These findings do not imply that liars and truth tellers
cannot be differentiated on the basis of inconsistencies across
repeated interviews. Indeed, a number of features of Granhag
and Strömwall’s experimental setup facilitated the liars’ use
of the repeat strategy (see Fisher et al., 2013). If these
favorable conditions are removed, then contradictions may
arise. Specifically, in the studies by Granhag and Strömwall the
questions were about central aspects of the event and hence could
be anticipated by liars (Fisher et al., 2013). Also, the participants
knew they would be interviewed several times (Strömwall and
Granhag, 2005), so they might have rehearsed their stories during
the time between one interview and the next. In some studies
(Granhag and Strömwall, 2000, 2001, 2002), the first interview
was conducted shortly after the event, the second interview
4 days later, and the final interview 1 week after the second one.
Arguably, the liars’ memory trace for their fabrications might still
have been strong just 4 days after the event, and recalling the
false story at this point might have prevented further memory
decay (see Ebbesen and Rienick, 1998). Finally, Granhag and
Strömwall did not use any manipulation to make it difficult for
liars to fabricate a false story during the first interview, to encode
that story, and to retrieve it during subsequent interviews. As
explained below, all of these issues were addressed in the current
research.
Cognitive Load and Deception
Some of the new interviewing approaches to detect deception
are based on the notion that, in interview settings, lying is
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 2 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1702
fpsyg-07-01702 October 28, 2016 Time: 14:8 # 3
Masip et al. Deception Cues across Repeated Interviews
cognitively more demanding than truth telling. Inventing a
story is cognitively more difficult than just describing the
truth, the lie must be plausible and consistent with everything
the target knows or may learn, liars must remember their
fabrications to provide consistent statements in the future, must
monitor their online behavior not to look deceptive, as well
as the targets’ reactions to make sure targets do not suspect
deception, and must inhibit the truth, avoiding making slips
of the tongue (Vrij et al., 2010a). All of these tasks consume
cognitive resources. Cognitive psychologists have reasoned that
lying requires access to executive control processes involved
in suppressing the truth, searching for information in long
term memory, and assembling a lie in working memory (see
Gombos, 2006; Walczyk et al., 2013, 2014; Sporer, 2016).
Supporting these notions, neuroimaging studies have shown that
brain areas involved in working memory, response monitoring
and conflict, inhibition, and multitasking are active during
deception (see meta-analyses by Christ et al., 2009; Farah
et al., 2014; Gamer, 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014), and cognitive
psychology studies have shown that lying requires greater access
to executive control processes than truth telling (e.g., Debey
et al., 2012; Visu-Petra et al., 2013; Fenn et al., 2015). Finally,
some linguistic markers of cognitive load are present more
often in deceptive than in truthful accounts (Hauch et al.,
2015).
Because lying during an interview is cognitively more
demanding than truth telling, artificially increasing the
interviewees’ cognitive load further during questioning should
be more detrimental for liars—who would then show observable
signs of cognitive overload—than for truth tellers. One way
of increasing cognitive load is asking interviewees to tell the
story in the reverse (rather than the chronological) order (Vrij
et al., 2008). Research shows that this procedure increases
deception cues and observers’ accuracy in judging veracity
(Vrij et al., 2008, 2012; Evans et al., 2013). Other ways of
increasing cognitive load are asking participants to report the
events in their non-native language (Evans et al., 2013) or to
stare at the interviewer’s eyes (Vrij et al., 2010b), as well as to
deplete the interviewees’ cognitive resources before the interview
(Blandón-Gitlin et al., 2013). All of these strategies have been
successful in creating behavioral differences between liars and
truth tellers. Walczyk et al. (2005, 2009, 2012) introduced a more
articulated interview approach called TRI-Con (Time Restricted
Integrity-Confirmation) that involves posing questions to
induce cognitive load during lying but facilitate responding
during truth-telling. TRI -Con research has also yielded
encouraging results (Walczyk et al., 2005, 2009, 2012). Based
on this research, we also artificially increased the interviewees’
cognitive load to magnify the differences between liars and truth
tellers.
The Present Procedure
The goal of the current study was to design a new, cognitive-
load based interview procedure to detect deception on the
basis of inconsistencies across repeated interviews. Guilty
participants committed a mock crime, whereas innocent
participants performed several tasks at the request of an
experimenter. All participants were then informed that they
were suspects of the crime and would be interviewed. They
had to convince the interviewer that they had performed the
tasks of the innocent participants rather than committing the
crime. Prior to the interview, guilty participants were invited
to request from the experimenter as much information about
the tasks carried out by the innocent participants as they
deemed necessary to convince the interviewer that they were
innocent. The interview was conducted almost immediately.
One week later, the participants were unexpectedly interviewed
again. Before each interview, participants were motivated to be
convincing—those judged to be deceptive by the interviewer
would be asked to write a text about a negative topic.
Both interviews were identical and had the following specific
features:
(a) The focus of the interviews was solely on the alibi (i.e., the
innocent tasks), not on the crime. In certain circumstances,
a strong focus on the alibi might be beneficial to ascertain
the truth. To know whether a suspect is truthful or deceptive,
that person’s statement may be checked against known facts.
These known facts may concern the crime, or they may
concern the alibi. Because offenders often take precautions
not to be discovered, the police have a limited amount
of information about the crime. However, under certain
circumstances, the police can have information about the
alibi. Good police work involves thoroughly investigating
alibis, whether it is people, location or events. The suspects’
responses may then be compared against that information.
For instance, imagine that a crime has been committed and
suspect A tells the police that she had been watching TV
Channel 1 at the time of the crime. The police may learn
about the details of the program being shown at the time
and question the suspect. If she did not watch the program,
she might not be able to reply to a number of questions.
If she asked someone else about the program contents, she
might have asked only about the central details; so, including
questions about some peripheral details may possibly reveal
her lies. Suspect B tells the detective that, at the time of
the crime, he accompanied a friend who lives in a distant
small town to a nearby police station where the friend filed
a complaint. The detective can contact the police station in
the small town to get an accurate description of the place, as
well as details specific of the time the suspect had purportedly
visited the police station (who was at the station, what was
happening, etc.).1 The current procedure could potentially be
utilized in cases of this kind.
(b) Both central and peripheral questions were asked. Central
questions inquired about the actions performed by the
suspect and the details on which the suspect focused his
or her attention. These central details cannot be changed
without changing the story. Peripheral questions were about
details and actions irrelevant for the story. These peripheral
1This example is modeled after a real case in which the defendant himself had
been in police custody at a different police station at the time of the crime. He
was eventually convicted for a crime he could not have committed (see Schulte,
2013).
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aspects can be changed with the main storyline remaining the
same. These definitions were made after examining a large
number of articles to ascertain how memory researchers
had defined or understood central and peripheral details
(e.g., Heuer and Reisberg, 1990; Burke et al., 1992; Ibabe,
2000; Ibabe and Sporer, 2004; Luna and Migueles, 2009).
We anticipated that guilty suspects would request from
the experimenter less information about peripheral than
about central details, and hence liars would have little
peripheral information to respond. Conversely, innocent
suspects actually experienced the event and therefore would
have more peripheral information than guilty suspects.
Even though our focus was on peripheral vs. central
questions, there is an overlap with unexpected vs. expected
questions (see Vrij et al., 2009; Lancaster et al., 2013).
Certainly, although not all unexpected questions are
peripheral, probably most peripheral questions are
unexpected. Earlier we referred to the study by Vrij
et al. (2009) exploring the potential of unexpected questions
to identify pairs of liars. More recently, unexpected questions
have been tested as a way to identify individual liars: because
liars prepare the answers to expected (but not to unexpected)
questions, they provide more details in responding to
expected than to unexpected questions (Lancaster et al.,
2013). Despite the parallelism, the present study differs
from previous research in a number of ways: first, we
examined the impact of peripheral and central questions
on alibi construction; second, we used novel procedures
(repeated interviews); and third, we examined dependent
variables not explored in previous unexpected questions
research—namely, inconsistencies and evasive answers.
(c) The questions focused on very specific details (e.g., the color
of the office door). Most questions could be answered with
just one word or a few words, and involved just one unit
of information. This was done to facilitate measurement and
coding of the dependent variables.
(d) Interviewees were requested to respond as soon as possible
after listening to each question. This request, which is a
component of another new interview technique to detect
deception (Walczyk et al., ’s 2005, 2012; TRI-Con) and is
also employed in response latency based approaches to detect
guilty knowledge (Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011), was
employed in the present study to increase cognitive load to
magnify differences between liars and truth tellers. Asking
to reply quickly is cognitively demanding: first, searching for
information in long term memory requires time, particularly
if the memory is poorly encoded. Second, if the requested
information cannot be retrieved from memory, then the
[deceptive] individual needs to invent a story, which is
even more difficult (Vrij et al., 2010a), requiring more time.
Having suspects perform these cognitively complex tasks
(which require time and concentration) quickly requires
mental effort, particularly for liars, whose memory trace for
the event is weak or non-existent.
(e) A crucial feature was that the interview was repeated after one
week, and the participants were unaware that they would be
interviewed again.
Hypotheses and Rationale
Request of Information to Prepare an Alibi
Guilty participants were invited to request information about the
innocent tasks from the experimenter in order to be convincing
during the interview. We assumed that guilty participants would
not expect peripheral questions to be asked and would thus
believe that a schematic linear account (what they did, where,
and how) would suffice to be convincing. Therefore, we predicted
that to prepare their alibi, guilty participants would request
central rather than peripheral information from the experimenter
(Hypothesis 1).
This hypothesis was in line with some considerations of the
credibility assessment literature (e.g., Koehnken, 1996, 2004;
Sporer, 2004, 2016; Volbert and Steller, 2014). Criteria-based
Content Analysis (CBCA) is a set of 19 verbal criteria that
are assumed to be more strongly present in truthful than in
deceptive accounts (see Steller and Koehnken, 1989; Koehnken,
2004; Vrij, 2008). Scholars have suggested that several of the
CBCA criteria reflect the notion that truth tellers, who describe
an episodic autobiographical event, will spontaneously include
in their statements more spatial, temporal, and self-related
information than liars (Sporer, 2004), as well as more script-
deviant details (i.e., information that does not fit the mental
schema or “script” that people may have of a specific kind of
event; see Schank and Abelson, 1977). On the contrary, liars
“will not come up with the idea of integrating such information”
(Volbert and Steller, 2014, p. 212; see also Sporer and Kuepper,
1995; Koehnken, 1996, 2004; Sporer, 2016). Liars may not think
specific, contextual, or script-deviant details to be important
to fabricate a convincing account. Examining this issue in the
context of alibi construction is a novel enterprise, and it can
suggest new ways of taking advantage of the weaknesses of alibi
fabrication to ascertain the truth.
Inaccurate Answers as a Deception Cue
Innocent participants performed the innocent tasks. Therefore,
they probably encoded relevant information and would be able to
retrieve that information from memory during both interviews
(though some memory decay was expected). This would result
in high memory accuracy, as well as little inconsistencies across
interviews for truth tellers. Conversely, guilty participants did
not perform the innocent tasks. All they knew about these
tasks was what they had learned from the experimenter, who
simply answered their questions. This information may be
incomplete and poorly encoded. Because of this, we predicted
that in both interviews guilty participants would correctly
answer fewer questions than innocent participants (Hypothesis 2).
Furthermore, this effect would be stronger when answering
peripheral rather than central questions (Hypothesis 3) because,
according to Hypothesis 1, guilty participants would have some
information about central details but no information about
peripheral details.
Inconsistencies
We compared the suspects’ answers to each individual question
across interviews. If the two answers were semantically the
same, this was coded as consistent. If they were different, this
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was coded as inconsistent. We predicted that guilty participants
would change their answers from one interview to the next
(i.e., would show inconsistencies) more often than innocent
participants (Hypothesis 4), and that this effect would be stronger
for peripheral than for central details (Hypothesis 5). Unlike
Granhag and Strömwall (1999, 2000, 2001, 2002; Granhag
et al., 2003; Strömwall and Granhag, 2005), we created the
conditions for inconsistencies to appear among liars by impairing
a repeat strategy. First, although liars may have anticipated
being requested to provide a full narrative, they were asked
very specific questions. Second, some of these specific questions
were about peripheral details that liars may not have thought
of in preparing their alibi. Third, the retention interval was
relatively long (1 week). Fourth, the participants were unaware
that they would be interviewed again; this made rehearsal less
likely during the retention interval and hence facilitated memory
decay, particularly for poorly encoded memories—that is, those
of liars.
Concerning peripheral details, because liars would have less
peripheral information, they would have to invent the answers
during the first interview and recall those answers (provided
they wanted to be consistent) during the second interview.
However, the cognitive load induction procedure was designed
to undermine these strategies. Both encoding and retrieving
information from memory consume cognitive resources and
require attention and concentration. Research has consistently
shown that a secondary task that consumes cognitive and
attentional resources hinders the encoding of new information,
and increases reaction times during retrieval (e.g., Baddeley
et al., 1984; Craik et al., 1996; Iidaka et al., 2000). Similarly,
Chandler and Sweller (1996) demonstrated that cognitive load
has a detrimental effect on learning. Therefore, we expected
that during the first interview the induced cognitive load would
hinder the encoding of the deceptive answers hastily made up on
the spot. Cognitive load could also have a negative effect on the
retrieval of these answers during the second interview, because
the participants had been asked to reply quickly.
Cognitive load would presumably affect not only the liars’
answers to questions about peripheral details, but also their
answers to questions about central details. Indeed, cognitive
load may increase the difficulty in retrieving poorly encoded
or incomplete memories about central details during both
interviews, also contributing to generating inconsistencies for
central details in liars (as predicted in Hypothesis 4).
Evasive Answers
We defined evasive answers as replies that contain no relevant
information. For example, statements such as “I don’t know,” “I
don’t remember” or the like qualify as evasive answers. Replying
“there was no poster” when asked on which wall there was a
poster (provided there was actually a poster) should also be
coded as an evasive answer—the suspect gives a response but the
response contains no substantive answer to the question. Guilty
participants asked to reply quickly and unable to retrieve the
requested information from memory or to invent a plausible lie
may ultimately resort to providing evasive answers to get out of
the stalemate. They have been asked to reply quickly but they
cannot find the relevant information and cannot quickly invent
a lie, so they may see saying “I don’t know” as the only way to
escape from the situation. Thus, we predicted that guilty suspects
would provide more evasive answers than innocent suspects
(Hypothesis 6), particularly in response to peripheral questions
(Hypothesis 7).
Predictive Value of the Dependent Variables on
Veracity
In addition to examining the impact of guilt status on response
accuracy, consistency, and evasive answers, we also ran several
binary logistic regression analyses to examine whether guilty and
innocent participants could be correctly identified on the basis
of each of these variables. These analyses were run both with
no cross-validation and with the leave-one-out cross-validation
method (Note: in only one case did classification rates vary as
a function of whether cross-validation was used; see the results




Participants were 48 White undergraduate criminology students
(30 females and 18 males; Mage = 19.71 years, SD = 2.70) who
volunteered to take part in the study in exchange for an academic
incentive. Guilty participants (n = 24) had their lectures in
the morning whereas innocent participants (n = 24) had their
lectures in the evening. In the criminology degree, students in
each group (i.e., morning or evening group) hardly know or
interact with those of the other group. Therefore, our guilty and
innocent participants could hardly exchange any information
about their respective tasks. Group allocation is made by the Law
School administration, and is based on the first letter of each
student’s family name. Guilty and innocent participants did not
differ significantly in terms of gender (15 females and 9 males in
each condition) or age (guilty participants: Mage = 19.42 years,
SD= 1.82; innocent participants: Mage = 20.00 years, SD= 3.38;
t(46)= 0.75, p= 0.460.
Procedure
The experimental sessions were conducted over several weeks.
During Week 1, guilty participants committed the mock crime
and were interviewed for the first time. During Week 2, they
were interviewed for the second time. Similarly, during Week
3, innocent participants performed the innocent tasks and were
interviewed. Then, during Week 4, innocent participants were
interviewed again.2 All instructions, experimental procedures,
and interviews were scripted. Scripts (in Spanish) are available
from the first author on request. The procedures were
2The reason why guilty participants were run first was that most of the hypotheses
were based on the notion that guilty suspects would have little information
about the innocent tasks. As described in the text, we took measures to prevent
participants from sharing information about the study, but we nevertheless
adopted the essential precaution of running the uninformed guilty participants
first.
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in accordance with institutional, national, and international
(the American Psychological Association’s) ethics guidelines.
Informed consent was obtained from all participants, and
participants were free to leave the experiment at any point.
Phase 1: Guilty and Innocent Participants’ Tasks
Each participant individually met an experimenter at a specific
location in the hall of the School of Psychology.
Guilty participants
The experimenter escorted each guilty participant to a laboratory
room. After signing an informed consent form, the participant
received the door key of Seminar Room 126 from the
experimenter. The experimenter asked the participant to imagine
that s/he simply happened to find the key. The participant’s task
was to use the key to slip into the seminar room, steal a wallet
(with some money inside) that was on top of a table, and return.
When the participant had returned with the wallet, the
experimenter turned on a video camera and told the participant
that s/he (the participant) was suspected of having stolen the
wallet and was about to be interviewed. The experimenter
explained that other participants had not stolen the wallet
but, instead, had performed several tasks with an experimenter
in an office room. The participants’ goal was to convince
the interviewer that s/he was innocent and had been doing
the alternative tasks. If s/he was successful in convincing the
interviewer, then s/he would not be asked to do anything else and
would leave straightaway. However, if the interviewer judged the
participant as being deceptive, then s/he would be asked to write a
text at least one page long about her/his least favorite high school
course. At this point, the following instructions were delivered:
Imagine this situation is real. Imagine that to avoid being sent to jail
you have to convince the police you were not involved in the crime.
To have an alibi to convince the interviewer that you are innocent,
please ask me everything you want to know about what the innocent
participants did.
The participant asked the experimenter questions about
the activities carried out by the innocent participants. The
experimenter replied to all of the questions providing only the
specific information requested by the participant, and nothing
more. This conversation was entirely videotaped. After the
participant finished asking the questions, the experimenter left
the room and the interviewer stepped in.
Innocent participants
The experimenter escorted each innocent participant to an office
room. The room had been set for the experiment such that there
were specific peripheral details that could be used to question the
participants about (a poster on a wall depicting Homer Simpson,
a vase with yellow flowers on a shelf, etc.). After signing an
informed consent form, the participant was told that s/he had
to perform four different tasks and could spend up to 4 min on
each. The first task was playing Tetris on a computer, the second
task was performing a number of specific arithmetic operations
on a sheet of paper, the third task was searching for the definition
of “dinosaur” in Wikipedia and pasting it in a Microsoft Word
file, and the final task consisted of watching a brief (less than
2 min.) fragment of a documentary and typing the answers to
some questions about the documentary in a Microsoft Word file.
After the tasks, participants were told that some other
participants had not performed these activities but, instead, had
stolen a wallet from a seminar room. The experimenter also told
the innocent participant that s/he (the participant) was a suspect
of the theft, was about to be interviewed, and her/his goal was to
convince the interviewer that s/he was innocent of the theft and
had been doing the alternative tasks. The rest of the instructions
were identical to those given to the guilty participants, except that
innocent participants were not invited to ask the experimenter
about the innocent tasks.
Next, the experimenter escorted the innocent participant
to a laboratory room to be interviewed. Guilty and innocent
participants were interviewed in the same room, and the setup of
the room, including the specific location of the camera and chairs,
was identical across all interviews.
Phase 2: The Interviews
All participants were interviewed twice—first shortly after
performing the guilty or innocent tasks, and then again 1 week
later. The interviews were run by 22 psychology undergraduate
students (all females, Mage = 22.00 years, SD = 1.16) who
participated in exchange for an academic incentive. Each
interviewer conducted 4.36 interviews on average (because
of unforeseen circumstances, not all interviewers conducted
the same number of interviews).3 The interviewers running
Interview 1 (n= 11) were different from those running Interview
2 (n = 11). Each interviewer questioned only guilty or only
innocent participants. Before running the interview, interviewers
were given detailed written and oral instructions, as well as a
written script with all of the questions. All interviewers were blind
with respect to the guilty or innocent status of the participants,
the details of the alibi, and the purposes of the experiment.
At the beginning of the interview, the interviewer told the
participant:
As you know, someone stole a wallet from Seminar Room 126 and
you are a suspect in this theft. I am going to ask you a number of
questions about your whereabouts during the last half an hour or
so. You have to reply and, in order not to appear suspicious, you
better do not allow much time to pass between my question and
your answer. I am going to record how long it takes.
Then, the interviewer set a timer and began the interview. All
questions are displayed in Appendix 1 (in supplementary online
materials). All participants were expected to (and did) reply “no”
to the first question and “yes” to the second question. These two
questions were not scored. Questions 3 through 18 were eight
central (i.e., these questions requested central information) and
eight peripheral (i.e., the question asked for peripheral details)
3We initially recruited 50 suspects, and five suspects were scheduled to participate
on every day. The five suspects of a day were all to be interviewed by the same
interviewer. Thus, each interviewer was expected to interview five participants,
and only 20 interviewers would be needed for all 50 participants to be interviewed
twice. However, we needed to replace three suspects because of technical problems
during Interview 1; this involved scheduling new sessions and recruiting additional
interviewers. Further, two suspects did not follow the instructions and had
therefore to be removed from the dataset.
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questions selected on the basis of a preliminary study (Appendix
2 in supplementary online materials). The interview was video
recorded. The interviewer was out of the frame, sitting in front of
the suspect. The camera was facing the suspect, who was sat on a
chair and was visible from the ankles up.
After the interview was over, the interviewer brought in the
experimenter, who had been waiting in an adjacent small room.
The interviewer indicated in a form whether she thought the
suspect was lying or telling the truth, as well as her confidence
in the judgment on a 1 (little) to 5 (much) scale. Then she
silently showed her responses to the experimenter and left. At this
point, the experimenter (a) thanked the participant for his/her
participation, (b) reminded the participant about the need not
to disclose information about the experiment to her/his peers,
and (c) reminded the participant that s/he had to come back
the following week to take part in a separate experiment. The
experimenter also escorted suspects judged (by the interviewer)
to be deceptive to the library, where they wrote a text about their
least favorite course in high school. They were requested to place
this text into the first author’s mailbox before leaving. All of the
suspects required to write the text did so.
The second interview took place 7 days later. The instructions
were almost identical to those of the first interview, except
that before the second interview neither guilty nor innocent
participants were invited to ask the experimenter about the
innocent tasks. The interview procedure, questions, and question
order were the same as in Interview 1. After each individual
interview, interviewers made a veracity judgment and rated their
confidence. The experimenter explained to the participants why
it was important not to tell the other participants that they had
been interviewed again until all the experimental sessions were
over, and asked them to sign a form promising not to disclose
this information until data collection was complete.
Post-experiment Questionnaire (Manipulation
Checks)
Next, the experimenter had the participant complete a post-
experiment questionnaire. Most of the questions were asked
twice, once referring to “last week” and once referring to “today.”
Most questions had to be answered on a 1 (low on the dimension)
to 5 (high on the dimension) scale. The following was in the
questionnaire:
To assess veracity manipulation: To what extent were your
answers during last week’s/today’s interview deceptive?, To
what extent were your answers during last week’s/today’s
interview truthful? (reverse scored), Did you try to lie during
last week’s/today’s interview?
To assess participants’ event knowledge: How much
information did you have at the beginning of last week’s
interview about the tasks performed in the office room with
an experimenter?, How much of this information did you
remember today?
To assess participants’ experience of cognitive load: How
much mental effort did you exert when replying to the
questions during last week’s/today’s interview?, How easy
or difficult was last week’s/today’s interview for you?, How
difficult was it for you to be convincing during last
week’s/today’s interview?
To assess awareness of experimental manipulations: Had you
anticipated you would be interviewed again this week about
the same issue? (No/Yes), Did anyone tell you before today
anything about what would happen during the second week?
(No/Yes).
In addition to completing the questionnaire, participants
judged to be deceptive by the interviewer during the second
interview were also requested to write about their least favorite
high school course. Before leaving, participants left the completed
questionnaire (and the high school text if they wrote one) in the
first author’s mailbox. Participants were debriefed later in class.
Transcribing and Coding
Guilty Participants’ Alibi Preparation
Guilty suspects asked the experimenter about the innocent tasks.
These conversations were videotaped, the verbal content was
subsequently transcribed, and the accuracy of the transcripts was
checked against the original videotape by a research assistant.
Two coders were given the definitions and examples of central
and peripheral questions and independently coded all questions
as either central, peripheral, or irrelevant (i.e., not related to the
innocent activities). Out of 210 questions coded4, 187 (89%) were
classified as central by both coders. The number of questions
coded as peripheral was only one according to Coder 1 and
four according to Coder 2. Across all three kinds of questions,
percent agreement was 93.3%. Disagreements were resolved by
discussion. The same two coders also independently assessed
on a 0 (no more information than requested) to 5 (much more
information than requested) scale whether the experimenter
provided more information than requested in answering each of
the questions by all guilty suspects. Virtually all answers were
rated 0 by both coders.
Accuracy and Consistency Responses
Two additional coders received all the videotaped interviews,
detailed coding instructions (both in written and orally) and an
Excel spreadsheet.5 The coders had to transcribe and code each
suspect’s answers in the spreadsheet. Suspects were presented in
a random order so that not all guilty or all innocent suspects
were coded first. Specifically, the two coders were requested to
independently (a) view the videos and record on the Excel sheet
each suspect’s reply to each question during the first and second
interview; (b) compare the two answers given by each suspect to
each question and code whether the answers were the same (1)
or different (0) (consistency codings); and (c) for each individual
answer, code whether it was correct (1) or incorrect (0) (response
accuracy codings). Note, the coders were informed about correct
responses just before doing this latter task. The two coders
4The total number of questions asked by guilty participants was 215. However,
unexpectedly, Coder 1 failed to code four questions and Coder 2 failed to code one
question. In all, the number of questions coded by both coders was 210 (98% of
all questions). These omissions were discussed afterward in the meeting the two
coders held to resolve discrepancies.
5All of this material is available from the first author on request.
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independently coded data for all 96 interviews. Reliability ranged
from substantial to almost perfect (Landis and Koch, 1977; Vieira
and Garrett, 2005): for consistency, percent agreement= 89.55%,
and Kappa = 0.72; for response accuracy in Interview 1, percent
agreement = 93.04%, and Kappa = 0.86; for response accuracy
in Interview 2, percent agreement = 92.27%, and Kappa = 0.76.
Disagreements were resolved by discussion. All transcripts and
coding decisions were subsequently checked by a researcher.
Evasive Responses
Two additional coders received written definitions and examples
of evasive answers, as well as the 96 interview transcripts.
They had to code whether each individual answer was evasive
or not. For Interview 1, percent agreement was 98.44% and
Kappa was 0.94; for Interview 2, percent agreement was




Amount of Information Obtained by Guilty Suspects
We had to ensure that the guilty participants did not receive
more information than requested from the experimenter.
The unrequested information could allow guilty suspects to
answer questions they did not anticipate, that is, questions
about issues they did not deem relevant. Coders rated on
a 0-to-5 scale the extent to which the experimenter over-
informed guilty participants. Out of 215 questions asked by
all 24 guilty suspects, 210 got a score of 0 and five a
score of 1 (M = 0.02, SD = 0.15). In short, guilty suspects
did not obtain more information than requested from the
experimenter.
Post-experiment Questionnaire
The scores for separate questions tapping the same construct
in the post-experimental survey were combined (see Cronbach’s
Alphas in Table 1) and analyses were run comparing guilty
and innocent suspects. As expected, across both interviews
guilty participants reported being more deceptive, having
less information, and experiencing more cognitive load than
innocent participants (Table 1). These findings show that our
manipulations were successful. None of the participants indicated
that someone else told them what would happen in the second
week, but four truth tellers and five liars had contemplated the
possibility of being interviewed again.
Request of Information to Prepare an
Alibi
Hypothesis 1 predicted that, to prepare their alibi, guilty
participants would request central rather than peripheral
information from the experimenter. The data strongly supported
this hypothesis. In all, the 24 guilty participants asked 215
questions. Of these, 197 (91.63%) were about central information,
and only five (2.33%) were about peripheral information. The
remaining 13 questions (6.05%) were irrelevant questions (i.e.,
questions unrelated to the innocent activities).6
Inaccurate Answers as a Deception Cue
A 2 (Guilt Status: Guilty vs. Innocent) × 2 (Question Type:
Central vs. Peripheral Questions) × 2 (Interview 1 vs. Interview
2) mixed Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), with repeated measures
on the latter two variables, was run on response accuracy
(i.e., proportion of accurate answers). Accuracy was higher in
replying to central, M = 0.70, SD = 0.30, than to peripheral
questions, M = 0.47, SD = 0.31, F(1,46) = 58.02, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.558, 90% CI [0.385,0.661]. Furthermore, as predicted by
Hypothesis 2, guilty participants, M = 0.33, SD = 0.13, gave
considerably fewer accurate answers than innocent participants,
M = 0.84, SD = 0.09. F(1,46) = 270.18, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.855,
90% CI [0.782,0.889]. However, contrary to Hypothesis 3, the
Guilt Status × Question Type interaction was not significant,
F(1,46) = 0.36, p = 0.551, η2p = 0.008, 90% CI [0.000,0.093].
Unexpectedly, the Question Type × Interview interaction was
significant, F(1,46) = 7.70, p = 0.008, η2p = 0.143, 90% CI
[0.022,0.294].7
To examine whether guilty and innocent participants could
be correctly identified on the basis of accuracy scores, we ran
a binary logistic regression analysis with accuracy scores as the
predictor variable. As shown in Table 2 (first row), classification
accuracy was perfect, as was the model fit to the data.
Consistency
A Guilt Status (Guilty vs. Innocent) × Question Type (Central
vs. Peripheral Questions) mixed ANOVA on consistency scores
(proportion of consistent answers across interviews) yielded a
significant guilt status main effect, F(1,46) = 17.08, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.271, 90% CI [0.101,0.421]. Supporting Hypothesis 4,
innocent suspects, M = 0.89, SD = 0.09, were more consistent
than guilty suspects, M = 0.71, SD = 0.20. The interaction
was significant, F(1,46) = 8.84, p = 0.005, η2p = 0.161, 90%
CI [0.031,0.313], and revealed that the difference in terms of
consistency between innocent and guilty suspects was larger in
responding to central questions, Minnocent = 0.93, SD = 0.10,
Mguilty = 0.67, SD= 0.24, p < 0.001, d= 1.41, 95% CI [0.78,2.05],
than in responding to peripheral questions, Minnocent = 0.86,
SD = 0.13, Mguilty = 0.76, SD = 0.22, p = 0.056, d = 0.55, 95%
CI [−0.02,1.13]. This latter finding was opposite to Hypothesis 5.
The question type main effect was not significant, F(1,46) < 1.
6As it is clear from the percentages, the difference between the number of central
and peripheral questions was significant, χ2(1) = 182.50, p < 0.001. A Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranked test was run with the participants (n = 24) as the
unit of analysis. The test also indicated that participants asked significantly more
questions about central than about peripheral information, z = –4.29, p < 0.001.
Support for Hypothesis 1 was also found considering the separate ratings of
each coder: Coder 1 coded 91.94% of questions as central, 1.90% as peripheral,
and 6.16% as irrelevant. Coder 2 coded 91.59% of questions as central, 0.47% as
peripheral, and 7.94% as irrelevant.
7This interaction revealed that whereas accuracy in answering to central questions
was higher in Interview 1, M = 0.72, SD = 0.31, than in Interview 2, M = 0.68,
SD = 0.31, p = 0.015, d = 0.14, 95% CI [0.03,0.24], accuracy in answering to
peripheral questions was similar across both interviews; for Interview 1: M = 0.46,
SD = 0.30; for Interview 2: M = 0.48, SD = 0.32; p = 0.294, d = –0.06, 95% CI
[–0.17,0.05]. Please note, however, that effect sizes were very small in both cases.
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TABLE 1 | Manipulation Checks.
Guilty suspects Innocent suspects t(46) p d 95% CI Number of
questions
Alpha
M SD M SD
Deceptiveness
Interview 1 3.83 0.86 1.31 0.44 12.80 <0.001 3.69 [2.76,4.62] 3 0.93
Interview 2 3.92 0.87 1.47 0.50 11.94 <0.001 3.45 [2.56,4.35] 3 0.91
Amount of information
Interview 1 3.00 1.22 4.17 1.09 −3.50 0.001 −1.01 [−1.61,−0.41] 1 −
Interview 2 2.83 1.24 3.63 1.06 −2.38 0.021 −0.69 [−1.28,−0.11] 1 −
Cognitive load
Interview 1 2.99 0.96 1.97 0.86 3.86 <0.001 1.12 [0.51,1.73] 3 0.76
Interview 2 3.18 0.76 2.33 0.89 3.54 <0.001 1.03 [0.43,1.63] 3 0.75
All variables were measured on 0-to-5 scales. Three Guilt Status (Guilty vs. Innocent participant) × Interview (Interview 1 vs. Interview 2) Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs)
were also run (available from the first author on request). The main effect of guilt status was significant in all three ANOVAs, and neither the interview main effect nor the
Guilt Status × Interview interaction were significant in either ANOVA.
TABLE 2 | Classification rates of binary logistic regression analyses, and interviewers’ accuracy rates (Bottom Row).
Predictors Classification Rates
Truths (%) Lies (%) Overall
(%)
Model χ2 df p Nagelkerke’s
R2
Response accuracy 100.00 100.00 100.00 66.54 1 <0.001 1.00
Consistency 70.83 66.67 68.75 15.88 1 <0.001 0.38
Consistency for central questionsa 87.50 58.33 72.92 22.20 1 <0.001 0.49
Consistency for peripheral questions
Evasive answers 87.50 87.50 87.50 35.09 1 <0.001 0.69
Evasive answers to central questionsb 87.50 83.33 85.42 39.07 2 <0.001 0.74
Evasive answers to peripheral questions
Consistency (recoded)c 70.83 62.50 66.67 18.15 1 <0.001 0.42
Consistency (recoded) for central questsa 87.50 62.50 75.00 22.19 1 <0.001 0.49
Consistency (recoded) for peripheral qs.
Combined variabled 95.83 91.67 93.75 54.13 1 <0.001 0.90
Interviewers’ accuracy rates 70.70 39.67 53.77 − − − −
aOnly predictor retained in binary logistic regression analysis with the forward - likelihood ratio method.
bWith the leave-one-out cross-validation method, the classification rate for lies was slightly lower (79.17%), and the overall classification rate was 83.33%.
cConsistency excluding all consistency instances caused by evasive answers.
d Inconsistent answers and consistent answers due to repeated evasive answers coded as 0, and all other consistent answers coded as 1.
Based on the guilt status main effect in the ANOVA, we ran a
binary logistic regression analysis with consistency scores across
central and peripheral questions as the only predictor variable.
As shown in Table 2 (second row), 70.83% of truth tellers and
66.67% of liars were classified correctly (overall classification rate
was 68.75%). Also, because the Guilt Status × Question Type
interaction was significant in the ANOVA, we ran an additional
binary logistic regression analysis with the forward - likelihood
ratio (LR) method with two predictors: consistency in replying
to central questions and consistency in replying to peripheral
questions. Only consistency for central questions was retained,
and the classification rates were 87.50% for truth tellers and
58.33% for liars (72.92% overall classification rate; see Table 2).
Evasive Answers
A Guilt Status (Guilty vs. Innocent) × Question Type (Central
vs. Peripheral Questions) × Interview (1 vs. 2) ANOVA revealed
that the proportion of evasive answers was higher in responding
to peripheral, M = 0.25, SD = 0.21, than to central questions,
M = 0.09, SD = 0.15, F(1,46) = 29.29, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.389,
90% CI [0.203,0.524]. It was also higher among guilty, M = 0.28,
SD = 0.13, than among innocent suspects, M = 0.06, SD = 0.07,
F(1,46) = 52.54, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.533, 90% CI [0.357,0.642].
This result supported Hypothesis 6. The Guilt Status× Question
Type interaction predicted in Hypothesis 7 was also significant,
F(1,46) = 4.37, p = 0.042, η2p = 0.087, 90% CI [0.002,0.228].
Even though guilty participants provided significantly more
evasive answers than innocent participants in responding both
to central, Mguilty = 0.17, SD = 0.19, Minnocent = 0.01,
SD = 0.02, F(1,46) = 16.68, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.266, 90%
CI [0.097,0.416], and to peripheral questions, Mguilty = 0.39,
SD = 0.18, Minnocent = 0.11, SD = 0.14, F(1,46) = 38.15,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.453, 90% CI [0.268,0.578], the effect was larger
for peripheral than for central questions.
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A binary logistic regression analysis with evasive answers
across central and peripheral questions as the predictor variable
yielded classification rates of 87.50% both for truth tellers and
liars (Table 2). Similar classification rates were obtained when
evasive answers for central and peripheral questions were entered
as two separate predictors in a logistic regression analysis with the
forward - LR method; these classification rates were slightly lower
but still around the 80% rate when cross validation was used (see
Table 2).
Additional Consistency Analyses
The above analyses revealed that (a) consistency is a valid
indicator of truth, and (b) evasive answers are a valid indicator
of lies. Recall that if a participant gave the same answer to the
same question in both interviews, that was coded as a consistent
answer ( = a truth indicator). However, if the same answer given
to both interviews was an evasive answer (= a lie indicator), this
was also coded as consistent ( = truth indicator). This suggests
that had we dismissed evasive answers in coding consistency,
the discrimination power of consistency ratings would have been
even higher.
We addressed this issue in two different ways. First, we ran all
consistency analyses again excluding all instances of consistency
that were caused by evasive answers from these analyses
(these cells were left empty in the SPSS dataset). The findings
(available from the first author on request) mirrored those of
the above consistency analyses. Logistic regression analyses with
the recoded consistency scores also yielded classification rates
similar to those obtained with the original consistency scores (see
Table 2).
Second, we created a new variable combining consistency
and non-evasive answers. As usual, inconsistent answers were
coded as 0 and consistent answers were coded as 1. However, if
consistency was due to evasive answers, this was coded as 0. In
this way, values of 1 denoted truthfulness and values of 0 denoted
deception. We expected truth tellers to score significantly higher
than liars on this new variable.
A 2 (Guilt Status) × 2 (Question Type) mixed ANOVA
revealed that scores on the new combined variable were
significantly lower for peripheral, M = 0.62, SD = 0.24, than
for central questions, M = 0.76, SD = 0.26, F(1,46) = 16.34,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.262, 90% CI [0.095,0.413]. Also, as predicted,
innocent suspects scored significantly higher, M = 0.86,
SD = 0.09, than guilty suspects, M = 0.52, SD = 0.16,
F(1,46) = 79.64, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.634, 90% CI [0.479,0.721].
Interestingly, the Guilt Status × Question Type interaction was
not significant, F(1,46)< 1, indicating that the difference between
innocent and guilty suspects was the same for central as for
peripheral questions. A binary logistic regression analysis with
the combined variable as the sole predictor attained a 95.83%
classification rate for truth tellers (23 out of 24 were classified
correctly), and a 91.67% classification rate for liars (22 out of
24 liars were classified correctly), with an overall classification
rate of 93.75%. As shown in Figure 1, the overlap between the
distribution of guilty and innocent suspects was very small; no
guilty suspect scored above 0.75 and no innocent suspect scored
below 0.69.
Interviewers’ Accuracy
Each interviewer conducted 4.36 interviews on average. The
overall accuracy rate of each interviewer was calculated, and
an ANOVA was run with interviewer (N = 22) as the unit
of analysis. Guilt Status (Guilty vs. Innocent) and Interview (1
vs. 2) were entered as between-subject independent variables in
the ANOVA, and the dependent variable was the interviewers’
accuracy. Only the main effect of guilt status was significant,
F(1,18) = 9.59, p = 0.006, η2p = 0.348, 90% CI [0.068,0.546].
Accuracy in detecting truths (i.e., in identifying innocent
suspects), M = 70.70%, SD = 22.86, was higher than accuracy
in detecting lies (identifying guilty suspects), M = 39.67%,
SD = 21.94. This was due to a strong truth bias among
interviewers: 63.91% of the interviewers’ judgments were truth
judgments, and only 36.09% were lie judgments, t(21) = 2.89,
p = 0.009, d = 1.23, 95% CI [0.32,2.15]. To facilitate comparison
with the logistic regression classification rates, we included
interviewers’ accuracy rates in Table 2 (bottom row).
Additional Guilt Status× Interview ANOVAs were conducted
on the interviewers’ age, number of interviews conducted,
proportion of deception (vs. truth) judgments, and judgmental
confidence. No main effect or interaction reached significance.
Surprisingly, the correlation between interviewers’ accuracy
and their confidence scores was substantial and significant,
r(N = 22)= 0.47, p= 0.028.
DISCUSSION
Recent deception research has focused on designing interviewing
approaches to increase behavioral differences between truth
tellers and liars (Vrij et al., 2010a; Vrij and Granhag, 2012; Vrij,
2014). The current study is in line with this new research trend.
In this paper, we described the first steps to create an interview
procedure to detect deception in which the senders’ cognitive
load is increased in order to elicit within-suspect inconsistencies
and evasive answers in liars.
Liars’ Alibi Preparation: Central Event
Details Were Prominent
We predicted, and found, that guilty participants would request
primarily central rather than peripheral information to prepare
their alibis (Hypothesis 1). This finding is consistent with the
credibility assessment literature, which shows that deceptive
statements are more script-like, schematic, and devoid of details
(sensory, perceptual, and contextual information) compared to
truthful statements (e.g., Sporer, 2004, 2016; Masip et al., 2005).
CBCA scholars have suggested that truth tellers spontaneously
include more spatial, temporal, self-related, and script deviant
information than liars, who may not think of including these
kinds of details (Koehnken, 1996, 2004; Sporer, 2004, 2016;
Volbert and Steller, 2014).
The present study adds to the scant alibi generation literature
(Culhane et al., 2008; Allison et al., 2011; Olson and Charman,
2012), and the findings have implications for deceptive alibi
detection. Although some research has been conducted on alibi
believability (e.g., Olson and Wells, 2004; Allison et al., 2012),
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 10 November 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 1702
fpsyg-07-01702 October 28, 2016 Time: 14:8 # 11
Masip et al. Deception Cues across Repeated Interviews
FIGURE 1 | Distribution of guilty and innocent suspects’ scores in the combined variable.
only rarely has deception research focused on alibies (see Culhane
et al., 2013). In the current study, the suspects’ failure in
obtaining sufficient [peripheral] information from an “informed
witness” (the experimenter) resulted in inaccurate, evasive,
and inconsistent answers during a subsequent investigative
interview. Culhane et al. (2013, Study 2) found that participants
did not perform better than chance in determining whether
videotaped alibi statements were truthful or deceptive. The
current experiment showed that, under the right circumstances
and with strategic interviewing, certain verbal cues can expose
deceptive alibies.
Interviewees’ Response Accuracy: Liars
Performed Poorly
The interview questions focused on the innocent activities. Since
truth tellers performed these activities, we assumed truth tellers
encoded rich episodic memories and would therefore be able
to recall information more accurately than liars during the
interviews (Hypothesis 2). The data supported this prediction.
However, contrary to Hypothesis 3, this effect was not more
pronounced in answering peripheral questions than central
questions. This finding suggests that although liars requested
and obtained central information from the experimenter, this
information either (a) was not sufficient to answer all the central
questions in the interview, or (b) was poorly encoded by liars,
who could not retrieve it later during the interview. Indeed,
manipulation checks showed that liars reported having less
information before each interview than truth tellers (see Table 1).
Classification rates obtained with a binary logistic regression
analysis with accuracy scores as the predictor variable were
perfect. This finding is rather impressive and came as a surprise.
The main focus of the present research was on inconsistencies,
and although we did expect differences between truth tellers and
liars in response accuracy, we expected these to occur mostly
in responding to peripheral questions and to allow for only
moderate discrimination. The present outcome suggests that
whenever the police can gather sufficient accurate central and
peripheral information about the alibi, they should ask suspects
about the alibi.
Catching Liars: Consistency and Evasive
Answers Were Effective
Prior research examining consistency across repeated interviews
has found no difference between truth tellers and liars,
presumably because liars adopt a repeat strategy—that is, liars
actively try not to contradict themselves across interviews
(Granhag and Strömwall, 1999). In this study we conducted
repeated interviews. However, we tried to impede the use of the
repeat strategy by asking focused questions (some of which were
about peripheral details), by requesting participants not to delay
their answers (thus increasing their cognitive load), by having
an expanded retention interval, and by keeping participants
unaware they would be interviewed again. These conditions
worked well, as we found liars’ responses to be less consistent
(Hypothesis 4) and to contain more evasive answers (Hypothesis
6) than truth tellers’ responses. Also, as predicted (Hypothesis 7),
the difference between liars and truth tellers in terms of evasive
answers was larger for peripheral than for central questions.
It is interesting, however, that the difference was statistically
significant also for central questions.
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Contrary to Hypothesis 5, inconsistencies in replying to
peripheral questions did not differentiate between innocent
and guilty suspects better than inconsistencies in replying to
central questions. Examination of the means reveals that whereas
innocent suspects were somewhat more consistent in replying to
central than peripheral questions, guilty suspects were somewhat
more consistent in replying to peripheral (0.76 on a 0-to-1 scale)
than to central questions (0.66). This high degree of consistency
among guilty suspects replying to peripheral questions decreased
the difference between innocent and guilty suspects’ consistency
for peripheral questions; as a consequence, Hypothesis 5 was not
supported.
Why were liars’ answers to peripheral questions so consistent?
Research on the forced confabulation effect has shown that
when people self-generate answers to unanswerable questions
(e.g., about non-existent details in a perceived event), they
might incorporate their confabulated responses in their memory
network and provide the same answer during subsequent
interviews (e.g., Pezdek et al., 2007). In the current experiment,
liars had little peripheral information; therefore, most peripheral
questions were unanswerable for them. Having to think and
generate an answer to unexpected questions could have made
it possible to incorporate that information to their memory,
information that was available at the second interview. An
alternative explanation suggests that when guilty participants
were asked peripheral questions and were unable to retrieve any
response, they experienced the situation as unexpected, salient,
and thrilling. This may have increased their attention, facilitating
the memory encoding of the unexpected or salient situation
(including the response given) during Interview 1, as well as
memory retrieval during Interview 2 (for evidence on the positive
effect of stimulus unexpectedness on memory, see Pezdek et al.
(1989); for evidence showing that emotional events are better
remembered than expected events, see Bradley et al. (1992)).
The predictive value of consistency scores and the proportion
of evasive answers to classify suspects as truth tellers or liars—
tested with logistic regression analyses—was around 70% for
consistency, and above 85% for evasive answers (Table 2). When
consistency and evasive answers were combined as described in
the results section, 96% of truth tellers and 92% of liars were
classified correctly. All of these classification rates were much
better (and considerably less truth biased) than the interviewers’
accuracy rates. Overall interviewers’ accuracy was 54%, which is
virtually identical to the meta-analytical mean reported by Bond
and DePaulo (2006). Interviewers’ accuracy was substantially
higher for truths (71%) than lies (40%), which is also typical in
the deception literature (Levine et al., 1999; Bond and DePaulo,
2006; Street and Masip, 2015; Street and Richardson, 2015).
Of course the interviewers were at a disadvantage. Although
they used an interview procedure strategically designed to induce
greater differences between truth tellers and liars, they had no
training in assessing the truth and deception cues relevant in this
study. They also did not have a chance to evaluate interviewees
both times. Nevertheless, the interviewers’ accuracy data are
interesting for at least two reasons. First, because they provide
a fair comparison condition to the logistic regression. Second,
because they suggest that high accuracy in deception detection
can be reached outside the immediate interview. When a strategic
interview procedure is used, even if the interviewers themselves
cannot unambiguously assess deception online, other trained
individuals evaluating such interviews may reach high accuracy
levels. Training in strategic interviewing and assessment of cues
likely to be elicited in the interview would seem to be productive.
Practical Implications, Caveats, and
Limitations
The current procedure could add to the extant arsenal of strategic
interviewing approaches to detect deception. It has a number of
distinctive features: it focuses solely on the alibi, uses repeated
interviews (specifically designed to create inconsistencies in liars
but not in truth tellers), and strategically employs both questions
about central details and questions about peripheral details. It
shows that indicators of cognitive load other than those examined
in previous research can be useful to sort liars from truth tellers.
An interesting contribution (from a research perspective, but
which may also impact practice) is that, contrary to the current
view in the field, inconsistencies across repeated interviews can
reveal deception if certain measures are taken. An additional
advantage of this interview technique is its brevity. But its
most outstanding feature is its extremely high classification rate,
outperforming the extant cognitive-load based approaches.
However, more research is needed before using the current
procedure in real-life settings. First, because the present
classification rates are very high, they need to be replicated.
Extreme rates are often viewed with suspicion (see Meijer et al.,
2013). Yet, recent deception research has consistently yielded
very high accuracy rates. Rather than an anomaly, these outcomes
are the result of a recent change in thinking that has led to
changes in research design and focus (Levine, 2015). Indeed,
some features of the current procedure may be responsible for
the high classification rates, particularly guilty participants having
to convince the interviewers they had performed some activities
they had only general information about.
Second, one may argue that rates would be lower had we
tested the predictive power of the cues with guilty and innocent
participants other than those from whom the cues were derived,
or had we tested the logistic function with a different sample.
Please note, however, that we ran the logistic regression analyses
both without and with cross-validation (with the leave-one-
out method). Classification rates were the same regardless of
whether cross validation was used for all analyses but one, and
the drop in classification rates for this exceptional case was
very small (see note b in Table 2). These findings indicate that
the logistic models were very robust and likely generalizable.
Moreover, our predictions were based on cognitive processes and
the functioning of human memory, which is very similar across
all healthy and normal individuals. Therefore, similar rates can be
expected with different samples. Nonetheless, we strongly believe
replication is important because the leave-one-out method does
not substitute for a real cross validation.
Third, human judgments may differ from computer-based
statistical classification. We are currently running a follow-up
experiment in which human raters (both lay respondents and
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police officers) are given detailed instructions on how to code
consistency and evasive answers, calculate the corresponding
proportions for each suspect, and judge whether each suspect is
lying or telling the truth using the empirically based cutoff points
derived from the current data. If humans follow the instructions
closely, identical classification rates as in the present study
should be obtained. However, this issue needs to be examined
empirically.
Fourth, if the current procedure is ever to be used in applied
settings, practitioners would need to know what cutoff point
they must use. In the current study, no guilty suspect gave the
correct answer to more than 53% of questions, and no innocent
participant did so to less than 65% of questions; thus, the optimal
cutoff point to separate liars from truth tellers was located
somewhere between 53 and 65%. For the combined variable, the
optimal cutoff point was 73.33% (see Figure 1). However, cutoff
points may differ across studies or situations. Nevertheless, the
current response accuracy results are highly encouraging. They
were likely due to guilty participants having little information
about the truthful activities. This may not be specific of this study,
but a feature shared by many false alibies. This issue needs to
be empirically examined in future research. Please note that the
cutoff issue affects most recent strategic interview approaches to
detect deception; however, it has hardly (if at all) been discussed.
We believe this issue needs to be considered before transferring
laboratory-based techniques to field applications.
Fifth, in real life, special care should be taken concerning
vulnerable suspects such as people with low IQ, highly
suggestible, highly anxious, or with memory deficits. These
personality characteristics may result in inaccurate, evasive or
inconsistent answers even among truth tellers. Sixth, interview
questions should presumably not involve false premises. Imagine
there was no poster and an ill-informed interviewer asks about
the location of the poster. In this case, replying “there was no
poster” would not necessarily be an evasive answer used by guilty
suspects to escape the situation, but could also be an honest reply
given by an innocent suspect. The extent to which evasive answers
are still useful to discriminate between liars and truth tellers when
the questions involve false premises is a topic we are planning to
examine in our future research.
Some additional caveats are in order. First, it can be argued
that the tasks that the innocent participants performed were
too artificial and different from normal real-life activities.
A distinction has been made between mundane, experimental,
and psychological realism (Aronson et al., 1998). Mundane
realism refers to the extent to which the events occurring in the
experimental context are likely to occur outside the laboratory
(Aronson and Carlsmith, 1968), experimental realism refers to
the extent to which the experimental session is involving to,
and taken seriously by the participants (Aronson and Carlsmith,
1968), and psychological realism is the extent to which the
psychological processes that play a role during the experiment
are the same as those occurring outside the laboratory (Aronson
et al., 1994). The hypotheses of the current study concerned
the cognitive processes involved in encoding and retrieving
central and peripheral information; thus, it was essential to place
innocent suspects in a situation where they were exposed to
central and peripheral details. However, it was irrelevant whether
the situation was an artificial experimental session or a more real-
life like event, because the cognitive processes involved in encoding
and retrieving central and peripheral information are the same in
both kinds of contexts. In other words, in this study psychological
(and also experimental) realism were far more important than
mundane realism. This does not limit the generalizability of
the findings to more naturalistic situations inasmuch as the
cognitive processes involved are the same (Aronson et al., 1998).
Notwithstanding these arguments, we are currently designing
more complex and ecologically valid studies to replicate the
current findings in more naturalistic settings.
Second, the interview consisted of a number of closed
questions. This is at odds with recommended strategies in
investigative interviewing, which stress the importance of using
open ended questions. The same can be said of polygraph tests
and TRI-Con. However, it should be noted that the main purpose
of all these procedures is to assess veracity rather than to collect
abundant information from suspects.8 Nonetheless, the present
procedure is compatible with the recommended techniques,
which could be used afterward. It is also important to note that we
are not suggesting that extant approaches should be replaced with
the current procedure (not even with an improved and refined
version of it). Instead, we believe that different situations call
for different interview approaches. The procedure we began to
explore could eventually be added to the interviewer’s toolbox
to be used whenever alibi information is available from other
sources and the suspect’s veracity is an issue.
Third, one can argue that the artificiality of the present
procedure (focused questions, quick replies. . .) may lead suspects
to refuse to cooperate (perhaps advised by their solicitors), or
the courts not to accept the evidence obtained this way. Again,
the same objections could be raised concerning the polygraph
test, which is nevertheless used in the US by law enforcement
agencies, the legal community, government agencies, and the
private sector (American Polygraph Association, 2010). The
polygraph admissibility in court varies across jurisdictions
(American Polygraph Association, 2010). The polygraph is also
used in criminal cases in Japan (Osugi, 2011). We see no
reason why solicitors, the courts or the potential examinee
would favor polygraph testing while objecting to our procedure.
Other researchers defend the real-life application of even more
artificial lie-detection methods, such as event-related potentials
(Iacono, 2015). Other novel interviewing procedures, like TRI-
Con (Walczyk et al., 2005, 2009, 2012) or reaction-time tests
(Verschuere and De Houwer, 2011), are also similarly, “artificial.”
Besides, presumably innocent suspects would not object to a
procedure able to prove their innocence. However, before using
new methods in real settings, replication studies are necessary,
as well as ecologically valid research examining the limits of the
8In reality, information about the alibi must be collected before using the
current approach, either via tangible evidence or from other human sources
(alibi witnesses). Also, unlike the polygraph Comparison Question Test, which
focuses only on detecting deception, the Concealed Information Test can also be
used to uncover new information (e.g., Verschuere and Meijer, 2014); however,
it is its potential to establish guilt (by showing that the suspect has “concealed
information”) that has been stressed by both researchers and practitioners.
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procedures and potential countermeasures (Blandón-Gitlin et al.,
2014). Furthermore, interviewers and the courts must be sensitive
that refusal is not indicative of deception per se, and that one
approach does not fit all: other approaches can be designed that
generate no reluctance at all from suspects to cooperate.
Fourth, Interview 1 and Interview 2 were run by different
interviewers. Critics may argue that this may have led suspects
not to care about being consistent in the second interview. This is
unlikely. The suspects knew the interviews were videotaped; thus,
the second interviewer could know what the suspect’s answers
had been during the first interview. More importantly, if a second
interview is conducted, a reasonable inference is that the answers
are going to be compared with those given during the first
interview. Therefore, if anything, suspects may have tried hard to
be consistent rather than not caring about consistency. In fact,
our data question the notion that suspects did not care about
being consistent, as both truth tellers’ (89% consistency) and liars’
(71% consistency) responses were considerably consistent across
interviews. However, future research should replicate the current
findings using the same interviewer across the two interviews.9
Fifth, both central and peripheral questions were asked during
the interviews. It is a tenet in the memory literature that recall
accuracy is better for central than for peripheral details (e.g.,
Ibabe and Sporer, 2004). This was also the case in the current
study. However, in order to avoid floor effects, we selected
peripheral questions for which recall in a preliminary study had
been relatively high (though still significantly lower than recall
for central information; see Appendix 2 in supplementary online
materials). The present procedure may not work if the interview
contains questions about peripheral details that innocent suspects
failed to notice or encode. More specifically, if truth tellers
did not encode peripheral details, one cannot expect them to
give accurate, consistent, and non-evasive answers when asked
about these details (see the polygraph literature for a similar
concern regarding the Concealed Information Test; e.g., Meijer
et al., 2016). If practitioners are to use this procedure in the
future, they should select for the interview only those pieces of
9A recent study by Shaw et al. (2014) found that switching interviewers increased
inconsistencies in liars. However, their experimental paradigm was entirely
different from the present one, which makes both studies hardly comparable.
While we examined consistency across repeated interviews, Shaw et al. (2014)
examined consistency within the same interview. Specifically, in Shaw et al.’s (2014)
paradigm, the interviewers simply left before finishing their job, being replaced
by new interviewers who completed the interview. Shaw et al. (2014) argued that
because truth tellers realized that the new interviewers had not heard what they said
earlier in the interview, they felt inclined to be detailed and to repeat what they had
said. This explanation cannot be transferred to our paradigm: we argued above
that, because suspects were videotaped, during Interview 2 they could infer that
the second interviewer could compare their answers with those provided 1 week
earlier during Interview 1. Shaw et al. (2014) also suggested that, for liars, the
idea that their answers would be compared was less obvious than it was for truth
tellers. It is unclear to us why this should be the case. Our parading also differed
from Shaw et al.’s (2014) in terms of type of event, type of questions, type of
response required, and—importantly—the way consistency was operationalized.
The cognitive operations involved in each paradigm [Shaw et al. (2014) vs. ours]
may differ. As a result, the outcomes of the two studies are not comparable (feel
free contact the first author for a more detailed account of the differences). It is
more likely that our findings were produced by the interview paradigm we used—
which was designed precisely to produce these findings—than by merely switching
the interviewer.
information most likely to have been noticed.10 Yet, note that the
guilt status effect on both accurate answers and the combined
variable was the same as strong regardless of question type. For
inconsistencies, it was stronger for central than for peripheral
questions. Therefore, practitioners would be well advised to use
these diagnostic variables (in particular response accuracy and
the combined variable) and to ask questions about noticeable
central details only.
Finally, critics may argue that suspects interviewed by the
police and then released may expect to be interviewed again.
We know of no empirical research examining this issue. Until
empirical data are available, any assumption either way is
unwarranted. It is also possible that if the current procedure
is ever used regularly in applied settings, then offenders might
know, they may expect to be interviewed twice, and they may
rehearse during the retention interval between the first and
the second interview. Note, however, that these circumstances
would potentially limit the use of inconsistencies but not the
use of evasive answers, which discriminated between liars and
truth tellers both during Interview 1 and during Interview 2.
Therefore, running just one interview might suffice to use evasive
answers as a deception cue. Besides, the current procedure cannot
be employed in all cases; thus, there would be no reason for
a specific suspect to assume that it would be used in his/her
case. Notwithstanding these arguments, research should be
conducted exploring the vulnerability of this interview procedure
to countermeasures.
CONCLUSIONS
Despite the above caveats and limitations, we believe the current
findings are encouraging. We expect the present findings to
replicate, and the procedure to be refined for its potential use
in applied settings. Take, for instance, the case described at the
beginning of this article. Both Kaled and Kuecken confessed to
the crime but later recanted. Several individuals claimed that,
at the time of the crime, the suspects were attending a party.
The police could have interviewed those individuals to collect
central and peripheral details about the party. A number of
focused questions could then have been created about those
details recalled by most of these individuals. Then, the police
could have interviewed Kaled and Kuecken using the procedures
described in this article. This way, maybe a miscarriage of justice
would have been avoided.
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